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Messrs. Kolbe, Tye, and Myers are highly skilled and thoughtful
economists. Their thoroughness, analytical abilities, and appreciation for
economic subtleties are well demonstrated in Regulatory Risk: Economic
Principles and Applications to Natural Gas Pipelines and Other Industries. The
authors present a lengthy and detailed argument that in setting rates of return,
regulators must specifically recognize the risk of potential disallowances on
the grounds that costs have been imprudently incurred or assets have turned
out not to be "used and useful." In the context of the arcane world of regulated
rate-of-return analysis, the work is professional, well documented, and quite
systematic, particularly in regard to natural gas pipelines.
Also demonstrated, however, are the inherent limitations of a narrow,
one-dimensional analysis of a very complex problem. Indeed, much of what
the authors describe as "regulatory risk" is not a function of regulation at all.
It is the inevitable result of a fundamental change in the markets of regulated
utility companies. The central irony of the book is that three learned
economists have spent their energy producing a monograph on rate-of-return
analysis amidst a tide of economic change that threatens to render such
analyses obsolete.
The book's approach is that of an accomplished expert witness responding
at great depth to a carefully defined question. In the broader world of utility
regulation, however, the theoretical underpinning of the work never moves
beyond a narrow and somewhat controversial economic analysis. Such analysis
is only a small piece of a much larger picture, critical to understanding the
subject of "regulatory risk."
The authors' call for specific recognition of "regulatory risk" would have
made for interesting hearing-room theatrics in the days of yore, when the
issues at stake really were played out in front of utility commissioners or
judges. Such narrowly crafted arguments, focused on specific outcomes, are
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of limited value in today's world of crumbling monopolies, market-driven
prices and returns, marginal costs lower than embedded ones, and regulators
who are no more able to hold back the tide than was King Canute. The hearing
room for which the authors' arguments were tailored is no longer the forum
for critical decisions regarding the minutiae of ratemaking. The market has
become the forum and it is not a sympathetic setting for the type of equity (pun
intended) arguments advanced by Messrs. Tye, Kolbe, and Myers. It seems
likely from now on that economic performance and economic performance
alone, not skillful lawyering and expert witnessing, will decide whether
investors are adequately compensated for the risks they take. It is market risks,
not regulatory risks, that will predominate in today's energy markets and they
are likely to do so well into the future.
Such narrowness of focus and lack of timeliness is most disappointing
coming from a trio of distinguished and deservedly well-respected economists
and observers of the regulatory scene. The authors attempt to address some
of the larger picture in regard to the natural gas pipeline industry, but leave
it largely untouched in other sectors, rendering the book's applicability to such
areas as electricity, telecommunications, and natural gas distribution
exclusively theoretical. On behalf of a utility clierit, particularly a high-cost
one, beset by regulatory disallowances, their expert testimony would, at one
time, have been of interest to regulators. But given the sweeping changes in
the industries they write about the book has an air of nostalgia about it,
recalling the bygone days when these issues were argued in a reasoned,
gentlemanly way that always culminated in decisional closure. Unfortunately,
the testimonial nature of their work bears little, if any, resemblance to the
rough-and-tumble of competition in today's utility markets. For this reason,
a non-economist reading the book might be reminded of the economist who,
when stranded on a desert isle with no apparent means of escape, exclaimed:
"What's the problem? Assume a boat."
The three authors have argued for some time that regulation, as they
perceived it being practiced in the 1980s, called for an increased focus on one
category of risk, "regulatory risk," in establishing rates of return. This book
constitutes an effort by them to elaborate on that theory, particularly as it
applies to the natural gas pipeline industry. The authors contend that they have
gone from being voices in the wilderness on the issue to having had their
theory accepted to the point that anyone who espouses it today is accused of
merely stating the obvious. Moreover, they contend that the Supreme Court
recognized their theory in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch.'
While Duquesne does recognize the theory of "regulatory risk," the result
of the case, namely the affirmation of the lower court's disallowance of non-
1. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
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"used and useful" assets, itself belies the significance of such recognition. The
mere existence of an asymmetrical risk in regulation that results in a
disallowance is not, in and of itself, grounds for reversing the disallowance.
The Court, while noting the possibility of a regulatory anomaly, nonetheless
chose to view the matter through the larger prism of the overall context of
Duquesne. Thus, it found that the scale of the disallowance did not rise to
constitutional dimensions. Such a finding calls into question the authors' claim
of recognition of "regulatory risk." Indeed, it is not at all clear that the Court
would find "regulatory risk" as being of constitutional import in any but the
most egregious of cases. In an increasingly competitive industry, perhaps that
is as it should be. Yet, in contrast to the Court's ruling and the realities of the
competing marketplace, the authors contend that in recognition of "regulatory
risk," it is now widely accepted that regulators should seek to establish rates
such that investors can expect to earn the cost of capital on their investment
instead of merely being afforded a reasonable opportunity to earn it, assuming
that it is prudently made and "used and useful."
The "regulatory risk" in question, of course, is the possibility that some
or all of the dollars invested by utilities for the purpose of meeting their
service obligations, along with a reasonable return on those dollars, will not
be recoverable because of the decisions of regulators. The denial could result
from a finding of "imprudence," i.e. that a risk was an inherent part of the
regulatory compact and therefore not compensable ex post, although prudence
reviews were rare prior to the 1980s, when utilities began seeking to recover
the massive cost overruns incurred in building nuclear power plants. More
recently, the question has arisen as to who bears the risk of assets that are no
longer "used and useful," either physically or, more likely, economically
because of competitive pressures, elasticities of demand, and fissures in
formerly monopolized markets. If investors' expectations concerning such risks
were reasonable at the time they made their investment decisions, then the
investors were presumably compensated for such risks in the rates of return
that were set at that time. If the risks could not have been reasonably
anticipated, then compensation for such risk-taking or for recovery of assets
left stranded by prudence disallowances or market pressures might be the more
appropriate regulatory path to follow, or so the authors maintain. It is their
contention that the risk in question could not in fact have been reasonably
anticipated by investors, whether because of the rarity of prudence reviews or
because of the lack of significant market pressures in the past.
There are, according to the authors, two different kinds of "regulatory
risk." The first is "the risk of some disallowance of the invested capital from
the rate base or other event that negatively skews the distribution of returns
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within a consistently applied ratemaking methodology."2 The second is a
"retroactive shift in the distribution of possible disallowances due to a change
in regulatory oversight . . . ."' Even the first type of risk, they assert,
requires an adjustment to the allowed rate of return. The idea that the
probability of a finding of imprudence may not be zero calls into question the
fundamental assumption that underlies the equation of the cost of capital with
the allowed rate of return. Had investors expected anything other than minimal
disallowances without explicit compensation for such a risk, they would not
have invested their capital, the authors argue. In any event, they maintain, the
traditional regulatory arrangement can no longer be sustained now that the
probability of disallowance is greater than zero.
The problem of the "regulatory risk" defined by the authors, as they
acknowledge, is not an easy one to remedy. Nevertheless, three options are
suggested. One is for regulators, and presumably judges and legislators, to lay
out the rules of the game, explicitly setting forth all of the risks on an ex ante
basis. If regulators wish to reserve the right to change the rules in the middle
of the game, then they should measure the risks objectively and implement
them in a reasoned and principled manner that is free of any opportunistic urge
to chop rates. The authors feel this option would not be feasible due to its
imprecision. A second option would be to increase the potential for profit in
a manner that is symmetrical with lowering the floor on the potential for loss.
That could mean, for example, raising the cap on earnings, or providing other
similar incentives. The third option for dealing with asymmetrical risk, the one
most discussed in the book, is for regulators to set the allowed rate of return
on assets that do get into the rate base at a level higher than the nominal cost
of capital, so that the overall expected rate of return, adjusted for the
"regulatory risk," will equal the true cost of capital. Unfortunately, the
question of how any of these scenarios can be applied meaningfully in the face
of rapidly developing competition (e.g., what does a higher allowed rate of
return mean in practical terms in a world where prices are market-driven and
not administratively derived?) is left largely unexplored.
All of the authors' suggested options involve highly subjective judgments
and political calculations, requiring complicated assumptions regarding both
capital markets and utility markets. While there is a strong, although by no
means conclusive, logic behind the remedial courses that are suggested, it is
purely internal to a regulatory regime that is rapidly disappearing. Indeed, one
could argue that the old regulatory regime was premised on the existence of
such economic parameters as economies of scale, declining costs, and vertical
2. A. LAWRENCE KOLBE ET AL., REGULATORY RISK: ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS TO NATURAL GAS PIPELINES AND OTHER INDUSTRIES (1993) at 37.
3. Id. at 38.
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integration. It is those parameters, as most observers would argue, that are
breaking down and bringing the old regulatory regime down at the same time.
The risk is not "regulatory" at all; it is economic. Regulation may change,
indeed it may attempt to redeem itself by toughening standards and demanding
more efficiency in performance, but the fact is that it is the economics of the
industry and not the logic internal to regulation itself that has been driving the
regulatory regime. Indeed, it is the ultimate irony of the book that three
distinguished economists have chosen to make lawyerlike arguments using the
logic of a legal forum and regulatory regime whose economic context has been
disappearing. One can label the disappearance of that context "regulatory
risk," but to do so largely misses the point.
Within their obsolete theoretical framework, the authors analyze in
considerable detail the experience of the natural gas pipeline industry. Their
analysis is thorough, thoughtful, and professionally competent. At the risk of
criticizing the authors for what they did not do, however, it is unfortunate that
the industry whose experience they rely upon to support their theory is not at
all typical of regulated industries in two areas that are absolutely central to the
formation of "regulatory risk": the concentration of regulatory power in a
single agency, and the preponderant role of policy makers (as opposed to
market forces or technology) in creating the circumstances that the authors
label "regulatory risk." Natural gas pipelines, for example, are regulated
exclusively by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in all areas
relevant to the formation of "regulatory risk." Electric utilities, on the other
hand, are subject to "regulatory risks" at the hands of state public utility
commissions, FERC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, Congress, and
state legislatures. While one could argue that such diffusion of regulatory
power increases the likelihood of an adverse regulatory result for a utility, a
more compelling argument is that the existence of multiple fora offers the
opportunity for forum shopping and gamesmanship that can mitigate
"regulatory risk." For example, the disallowance of a plant from the retail rate
base of an electric utility does not, in and of itself, strand an asset. If
wholesale outlets for its power can be found, then the asset's productivity is
preserved.
Another example of how diffusion of regulatory authority can benefit a
regulated entity is given by the litigation surrounding the Grand Gulf
(Mississippi) nuclear power plant, in which prudence reviews by state
commissions were precluded by the FERC. Because Middle South Utilities
(now Entergy) was a multi-state registered holding company and its Grand Gulf
plant was to serve affiliates in three states, among whom the costs were to be
allocated by the FERC, the Supreme Court held that the cost allocation by the
federal agency in that circumstance precluded each retail jurisdiction from
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doing anything other than passing on the entirety of the costs allocated to the
jurisdiction by FERC. In the telecommunications industry as well, regulatory
authority is far more diffuse than it is in the gas pipeline business.
Another unique aspect of the natural gas pipeline industry that renders
it quite different from other regulated industries is that the regulatory changes
it underwent were primarily, although not exclusively, related to its merchant
functions, not to its fixed assets. Unlike the electric utility industry, where the
"regulatory risk" scenario is likely to play out in the future, the largest part
of the pipeline industry's financial commitment was for the purchase of a
commodity. The significance of the difference is that the big dollars at risk in
the case of gas pipelines were contractual obligations for future deliveries of
commodities, rather than costs already sunk in fixed assets. Thus, the
regulatory decisions by the FERC in the transition to competition took into
account the interests of three large stakeholders-producers, pipelines, and
distribution companies. Consumers were one step removed, in the sense that
it was the state regulators who decided between local distribution companies
(LDCs) and consumers on those "take or pay" costs that FERC passed on to
the LDCs. Moreover, the gas itself was still in the ground, retaining its market
value. In electricity, the choices are far more stark. The costs are sunk. The
market value of the fixed costs may be negligible and there are only investors
and consumers to take the risks.
The argument for recognition of "regulatory risk" inherently assumes that
a regulator or policy maker is in a position to make choices that would pose
risk for the investor. But if the regulator is himself being driven by market
dynamics, or some other external set of circumstances, then "regulatory risk"
is a misnomer. The risk is derived from the exogenous forces which drive the
regulator as much as, if not more than, from what the regulator actually
chooses to do.
Regardless of the limited applicability of the natural gas pipeline
experience to other regulated industries, it is worthwhile to scrutinize the
validity of some key arguments advanced by the authors for the recognition
of "regulatory risk" in establishing rates of return. The book itself addresses
much of the criticism the authors have received on their theories and makes
an effort to refute countervailing arguments. Some of what they say is quite
convincing, some less so. For example, on the question of why investors
would have put their money on the table if the risks were so asymmetrical the
authors make a valiant, but ultimately unconvincing, argument that investors
did so based on a historically valid perspective that the risk of disallowance
was de minimis. While there may have been little in the way of significant
disallowances prior to the 1980s, the simple fact is that the principles upon
which those disallowances were based, namely prudence and "used and
useful," are hardly novel ideas. It is worth noting that the authors have lumped
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the two concepts together despite their fundamental differences. Prudence, of
course, is a concept that seeks to evaluate management's performance, while
"used and useful" is a largely economic concept used to reflect market
circumstances. From a purely asymmetric-risk point of view the difference
may be trivial, but from the point of view of "regulatory risk," the difference
is most vital. Both concepts have always been an important part of the
regulatory bargain, a fact that is reflected in the statutes and court decisions
of many jurisdictions. Indeed, their very existence was central to the triangular
relationship among regulators, investors, and management. Without the
prospect of disallowances or lower returns than initially anticipated, investors
would have little or no incentive to hold management's feet to the fire. Without
vigilant investors, the only accountability to which utility executives would
have been subjected was direct regulatory intervention in management, a
circumstance viewed almost universally as undesirable.
The centrality of that regulator-investor-management triad to the
traditional regulatory bargain indicates that prudence or "used and useful"
requirements were far from new ideas in the 1980s. The claim that specific
compensation should be afforded investors for "regulatory risk," from the
viewpoint of a lawyer (although perhaps not from that of an economist), comes
perilously close to categorizing the return on a utility's investment as an
entitlement, a notion not only entirely antithetical to the triad concept, but
perhaps a greater ex post change to the regulatory compact than anything the
authors complain about. The fact is that the utility that suffers from the greatest
degree of "regulatory risk" is the one that is likely to be performing poorly.
As the authors themselves suggest, to reward it with a higher return seems
contrary to any sense of appropriate incentives.
In the same context, the fact that there had been little in the way of
disallowances in the heady days of declining costs, economies of scale,
unquestioned monopoly, and steady growth rates, is not a very useful guide
to the world of the 1970s and 1980s with its volatile fuel prices, slow growth,
environmental demands, decline of scale economies, extraordinary cost
overruns in construction programs, and increased competition. No reasonably
alert investor-or manager-could have expected a static regulatory
environment amidst an otherwise radically altered energy landscape. Indeed,
as noted earlier, once could reasonably argue that the subset of risks that the
authors describe as "regulatory risk" are not regulatory at all. Rather they are
market, political, social, management, and other types of risks that investors
face all of the time.
Messrs. Kolbe, Tye, and Myers would likely respond that capital is
mobile and its cost equals the returns found elsewhere for similar levels of
risk. The problem with that idea is that the traditional and profound dilemmas
which constitute the regulatory conundrum go largely unrecognized in a book
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that seems doggedly determined to retain a narrow focus-one which time has
been passing by.
A reader of the book, without independent knowledge of regulated
industries, would come away with the belief that every major financial or
economic event in those industries is driven by regulators who operate in a
vacuum devoid of demand elasticities, emerging competition, social needs,
varying degrees of management capability among regulated companies, and
local economic development considerations, among other factors. The fact that
most regulators are themselves market-driven in the sense that they try to set
prices and make decisions in a manner that simulates what a competitive
market would have produced, is given only limited attention in the book.
Indeed, the very existence of an increasingly competitive market is only barely
mentioned. The authors seem oblivious to the extraordinarily difficult task
faced by regulators: to stimulate competition where little exists and to cope
with it where it does exist, a circumstance that has driven many of the "used
and useful" disallowances the authors complain about. That is particularly
unfortunate because it is difficult to understand how higher rates can be
imposed by administrative fiat on customers who have lower-priced
alternatives. In evaluating the "fairness" of disallowances, we should ask
ourselves a fundamental question: Would the regulated entities have fared
better in a fully competitive market? In some senses the authors cannot be
fully blamed for failing to address the problems posed by competition. To the
extent that they are writing about the historical events of the 1980s,
competition was merely in the birthing process in gas and electricity, although
telecommunications and transport competition were a little further along.
Nonetheless, by failing to adequately consider competition, the value of the
book is substantially reduced to either a historical review or, perhaps, to a
discussion of the treatment of stranded assets.
The authors' emphasis on ex post changes in the regulatory rules of the
game, its tight focus on capital markets to the neglect of the markets for the
products of the regulated industries and the limited recognition that regulators
do not operate in a vacuum that enables them to do as they please, all sound
more like the familiar whining of traditional utility managers trying to resist
the changes confronting them. Completely overlooked, for example, is the
possibility that risk may be symmetric in that ex post changes can favor the
utility. The passing of new laws or rules allowing for recovery under
Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) after construction has already been
undertaken on major projects, and FERC or SEC preemption of prudence
reviews (as in the case of the Grand Gulf power plant or where the market
value of assets exceeds their book value) are examples of ex post changes that
benefit utilities. In a similar vein, in their discussion of the theoretical
underpinning of the book, the only specific risk that the authors propose be
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singled out for reference in determination of the cost of capital is the
"regulatory risk" to the utility. A more balanced opening discussion might
have called for weighing a variety of specific risks that are more truly
representative of what confronts both investors and regulators as they make
their decisions. That lack of balance, coupled with the failure of the authors
even to consider the possibility of symmetrical changes in the rules of the
game, reveals a strong bias that casts a shadow over the work.
On a general note, the authors sometimes have the unfortunate habit of
getting in their own way when making a point. There are frequent analogies
to other matters such as game theory and "moral hazards" in insurance that
serve more to create controversy on the margin than to make the point at hand.
For example, analogies to the "moral hazard" theory in insurance, an
economic theory which is at best highly suspect as a predictor of behavior and
bears no real applicability to the subject of the book, are not helpful to either
the reader or the authors themselves.4 In a similar vein, the reader's task
would be greatly facilitated if much of the substance contained in the footnotes
were woven into the primary text. Dividing substantive material between text
and footnotes makes it far more difficult for the reader to follow the authors'
line of reasoning.
In conclusion, the authors have written what amounts to a theoretical
justification for an added element of expert testimony in utility rate cases.
Within those confines, it is the work of competent craftsmen. Limiting,
although certainly not eliminating, the book's relevance, however, are the
fundamental changes occurring in regulated industries which seem likely to do
away with the notion of administratively derived returns on assets. Any
broader value of the work is greatly diminished by the authors' failure to
address this larger context within which regulatory decisions must be made.
4. It is true as a matter of economic theory that an insured value of real property, for
example, in excess of market value provides a perverse incentive for the insured. In practice,
however, such non-economic variables as honesty, criminal penalties, sentimental attachments,
and a variety of other factors render the theory largely meaningless. Unfortunately, the existence
of the theory, even absent actuarial validation, has led to such pernicious practices by insurers
as redlining entire inner-city neighborhoods where the replacement value of houses exceeds the
market value.

